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We examine the effects of learning by migrating on the productivity of migrants who
move to a “megalopolis” from rural areas using the Thailand Labor Force Survey. The
main contribution is to the development a simple framework to test for self-selection
on migration decisions and learning by migrating into the urban labor market, focusing
on experimental evidence in the observational data. The role of the urban labor market
is examined. In conclusion, we find significant evidence for sorting: the self-selection
effects test (1) is positive among new entrants from rural areas to the urban labor mar-
ket; and (2) is negative among new exits that move to rural areas from the urban labor
market. Further, estimated effects of learning by migrating into a “megalopolis” have
a less significant impact. These results suggest the existence of a natural selection (i.e.
survival of the fittest) mechanism in the urban labor market in a developing economy.
Keywords: self-selection, learning by migrating, survival of the fittest, exits, Thailand
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1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to examine the effects of learning by migrating on
the productivity of migrants who move to a “megalopolis” from rural areas using
the Thailand Labor Force Survey Data, 1994 to 1996. The main contributions of
this paper are: (1) providing a simple empirical framework to identify between
self-selection effects in migration decisions and learning by migrating effects; (2)
discussing the role of the urban labor market (i.e. natural selection or location
of human capital accumulation). This study is one contribution to understanding
the unobserved characteristics of migrants in a concentrated area. Policy makers,
economists, and researchers of other fields such as sociology and anthropology are
also interested in sorting through urban immigration and unobserved heterogene-
ity of urban workers. In particular, policy makers, macroeconomists, and labor
economists are interested in the role of such a concentrated area to provide job
matching and their aggregate properties. Due to the causal effects of migration
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decisions and individual characteristics, it has been difficult to identify the true
impact of concentrated areas on migrant’s wages and job matching. Thanks to
exogenous sources of variation (or natural experiments) in the available empirical
data, the impact of migration on wages is consistently estimated. Based on these
estimates, we can begin to discuss the role of the urban labor market, active labor
market policies in urban areas, and their aggregate implications.
Trying to identify self-selection effects and learning effects among migrants is a
growing field. Using observational data, whether we use repeated cross-section or
panel data become a serious concern. Using cross-section data, Borjas, Bronars and
Trejo (1992) find positive self-selection among inter-state migrants in the United
States. Tunali (2000) finds evidence of a lottery in the outcomes from migration
decisions in Turkey. His result suggests that a substantial portion of migrants re-
alize negative gains and a minority realize very high gains from migration. Using
panel-data, Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) study a similar question on the ex-
port market using panel-data. No empirical evidence of learning effects (i.e. im-
proving productivity) by exporting are observed from their analysis. Self-selection
in the domestic market is the main explanation for becoming exporters. Glaeser
and Mare´ (2001) finds learning by migrating effects in cities after movements
from small cities to large cities. On the other hand, studying internal learning by
migrating effects is also a growing field: Yamauchi (2003) finds that comple-
mentarities between schooling and experience are reinforced as a migrant’s
experience increases in the destination market (Bangkok Metropolitan Area) using
Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994 to 1996. Using the same data as Yamauchi
(2003), Yamauchi and Tanabe (2006) conclude that the employment probability
of recent migrants is negatively affected by a large population size of previous
migrants originating from the same region and positively affected by success of
the previous migrants in getting work. Kimura (2004) examines the main explana-
tions for the urban wage premium: learning skills and learning job opportunities
in the urban labor market using household-block-level data in the Thailand Labor
Force Survey. Like previous studies on the aggregate labor market and urban
immigration, this study uses pooled cross-sections. Munshi (2003) focuses on
employment at the destination among Mexican migrants in the U.S. labor market.
He uses rainfall in the origin (Mexico) as an instrumental variable to identify origin-
communities network effects on employment opportunities at the destination.
Combes, Duranton and Gobillon (2003) estimate a model wage determination
across the French local labor market using a large panel of workers. They control
for worker characteristics, worker-fixed effects, industry-fixed effects, and the
conditions of the local labor market using a competitive equilibrium model. They
find that ability sorting is the main explanation for spatial wage disparities.
Two unique characteristics in the available data are useful for our analysis: the
“reason for migration” and “duration of stay” of migrants. A controlled experi-
ment is constructed with these variables in the Thailand Labor Force Survey. This
experiment enables us to identify self-selection effects and learning effects and to
estimate the effects of concentrated area using observational data. The variable the
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“reason for migration” includes two types of migrants; job-seekers and migrants
who move along with the household head. The location choice for job-seekers
is self-selective based on their observed and unobserved characteristics. On the
other hand, the location choice for migrants who move with the household head
seems to be independent of their characteristics. Location choice is exogenous for
these household migrants. We can observe true location specific returns for mi-
grants who move with the household head. To see the degree of self-selection bias
for job-seekers, this paper compares the returns to location between job-seekers
and household relations migrants. Clear results are drawn from our identification
strategy. This is very similar to the study estimating the heterogeneity of reason
of displacement (plant-closing versus lay-off) on re-employment outcomes by
Gibbons and Katz (1991) and Gibbons and Katz (1992). Our paper is the first
attempt to identify self-selection and learning effects related to migration using
exogenous sources of variation in migration decisions. The variable “duration of
stay” for migrants suggests the possibility to examine learning effects of migra-
tion. There is a large wage difference between short-staying and long-staying mi-
grants in each location. This pattern is quite different for migration streams; rural-
rural, urban-rural, rural-urban, and urban-urban. The difference between cohorts
provides evidence of improving average productivity. The cohort difference be-
tween the reasons for migration (i.e. difference in differences) also provides the
solution to the difference of learning by migrating effects between two types of
migrants.
The innovative feature of this work is that we utilize experimental evidence
from observational data to identify the self-selection of unobserved characteristics
and examine the effects of learning by migrating in urban and rural areas, respec-
tively. The main results are: first, positive self-selection among new migrants to
urban from rural areas (i.e. new entrants into the urban labor market); secondly,
negative self-selection among new migrants in rural areas (i.e. “new exits” from
the urban labor market). These results suggest the existence of a natural selection
(survival of the fittest) mechanism in the urban labor market. “New exits” from
the urban area seem to have the potential to take their acquired skill. These results
show learning by migrating effects in urban area over time. This effect is larger in
urban than rural areas.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes a simple model for under-
standing some empirical hypotheses. Section 3 shows the structure of the dataset of
the Thailand Labor Force Survey. Section 4 contains a simple identification frame-
work for studying self-selection effects on unobserved abilities and learning by
migrating effects. While Section 5 deals with the estimation of self-selection bias
on individual characteristics, Section 6 focuses on learning by migrating effects. In
the final Section, we conclude the paper and discuss the remaining issues.
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Table 1 Position of urbanization patterns for Thailand in the world
Rank Country Primacy Country Megalopolis Country Urbanization
1 Thailand 24.994 Angola 0.857 UAE 0.997
2 Angola 15.520 Azerbaijan 0.846 South Korea 0.736
3 Chile 14.847 Ireland 0.841 Dominican 0.727
4 Peru 10.332 Paraguay 0.832 Lebanon 0.722
5 Lebanon 9.847 Sierra Leone 0.828 Japan 0.696
6 Sierra Leone 9.221 Lebanon 0.814 USA 0.689
7 Madagascar 9.078 Kyrgyzstan 0.785 Australia 0.659
8 Argentina 8.787 Tajikistan 0.7712 Venezuela 0.644
9 Hungary 8.707 Thailand 0.7706 Mexico 0.633
10 Mali 8.542 El Salvador 0.750 Chile 0.623
91 Ecuador 1.307 Venezuela 0.203 India 0.159
92 South Africa 1.282 South Africa 0.197 Mali 0.154
93 USA 1.267 Poland 0.173 Thailand 0.150
94 Vietnam 1.236 Germany 0.167 Tajikistan 0.147
95 China 1.194 Netherlands 0.159 Kenya 0.141
96 Cameroon 1.157 Ukraine 0.138 Madagascar 0.131
97 Australia 1.150 Russia 0.135 Sri Lanka 0.092
98 UAE 1.103 India 0.113 Niger 0.091
99 Syria 1.059 USA 0.085 Ethiopia 0.062
100 Netherlands 1.035 China 0.047 Nepal 0.056
Notes: Primacy means the level of urban primacy: ratio of urban population residing in the largest
city, to the second largest city. The urban primacy of Thailand (about 25) is the highest in the world.
Megalopolitan population means the ratio of the Greater Bangkok Area to total urban population in
Thailand. Almost 77% of urban residents are concentrated in Bangkok. These two indices show an
agglomeration of economic activity in Bangkok and also show that there is only one megalopolis in
Thailand. Finally, Urbanization means the ratio of the number of urban residents to whole domestic
population. Only 15% of the whole population is located in urban areas (i.e. almost 85% of the
population is located in rural areas).
Source: Author’s calculation from United Nations World Urban Prospects 2000.
2. The Attraction of Cities: The Bangkok Megalopolis
Let us start by focusing on the geography of Thailand. Table 1 shows the pat-
terns of urbanization of Thailand. We observe a unique position for Thailand in the
world from three indices of urbanization patterns. An urban area is defined as place
with over one hundred thousand inhabitants. This criteria is the lower bound of the
definition of urban area1). Primacy means the level of urban primacy and in the
case of Thailanld is the ratio of urban population residing in Bangkok compared to
the second largest city. The usrban primacy of Thailand (about 25) is the highest
in the world. Megalopolitan is the people living in Bangkok to the total urban pop-
1) We should notice that this criteria is correlated with domestic population. For example, the USA
seems to easily satisfy this criteria because it has a population of about two hundred million. On the
other hand, Thailand (60 million population ≈ 3/10 of the USA) does not satisfy this.
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ulation in Thailand. Almost 77% of urban residents are concentrated in Bangkok.
These two indices show an agglomeration of economic activity in Bangkok and also
demonstrate that there is only one megalopolis in Thailand. Finally, Urbanization
means the ratio of the number of urban residents to the whole domestic population.
Only 15% of the whole population is located in urban areas (i.e. almost 85% of the
population is located in rural areas). These indices show a clear contrast between
urban and rural areas in Thailand.
These indices of economic geography in Thailand can simplify our empirical
analysis. The same is not true, however, of the USA data. Large cities seem to be
distributed discretely in the USA. If we see the USA data, we have to set up multiple
discrete choice models. We refer to the Greater Bangkok Area as the urban area.
We assume that workers can commute to the center of Bangkok as long as they
locate in GBA. GBA seems to be a kind of basin of attraction. We also define all
rural areas as non-GBA.
3. A Model of Migrating and Learning in Megalopolis
This section presents a simple model of decisions to migrate to the Bangkok la-
bor market among workers in rural areas. The model is constructed by three stages:
migration, production, and reshuffling (exits). Stage 1 is the migration decision
stage. Production and reshuffling are stage 2 and 3, respectively. The model is
based on the study of migration decisions to the U.S. labor market among Mexican
migrants by Munshi (2003) and the schooling (English or local language) choice in
the Bombay labor market among castes by Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) (stage
1). The searching and production in the Bangkok labor market after migration is
based on the model of imperfect information, learning, and worker mobility by
Gibbons and Katz (1992) (stage 2 and 3).
3.1. Setup
The model provides an explanation and overview of the causal relationship be-
tween abilities, decisions to migrate to Bangkok, and natural selection through exits
from Bangkok labor market. The geography is simply divided into rural areas and
the Bangkok labor market. We assume that the Bangkok labor market is ruled
by the geographic boundaries of the Greater Bangkok Area (hereafter GBA). The
timing is divided into three periods. In the first stage, potential migrants (in rural
areas) decide whether they will move to GBA or stay in the rural area. The mi-
gration decision is based on the wage that the potential migrants will receive in an
urban job and rural job. Wages in the urban job (γ jωi) are assumed to be based on
the migrants’ ability or productivity. The returns to ability in the Bangkok labor
market is described by γ j. Wages in rural jobs such as profits from an agricultural
area R are not contingent on the worker’s ability or productivity. This assumption
can be relaxed in the empirical specification using an industry specific shock (σ) in
the rural area. This shock is considered to involve the agricultural sector or export-
oriented industries in the rural area. The returns to working in the rural area can be
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summarized as R(σ)2). On the other hand, individual’s abilities ωi are distributed
uniformly. The ability distribution of premigration (born) level of ability does not
between rural and GBA.
The second stage starts from the beginning of work in the urban job. Each firm
(or sector) j is endowed with a type of technology γ j. This is also returns to ability
in the Bangkok labor market. Each migrant produces a commodity and receives
wages Wi j = γ jωi under his/her own abilities and firm technologies. Following
the setting of Gibbons and Katz (1992), technology is restrict to two types; ability-
sensitive technology (γA) and ability-insensitive technology (γB). We assume that
the information on worker’s abilities is imperfect at this stage but improves over
time as long as migrants stay in the urban labor market. Job matching with urban
jobs is random at the second stage. We also apply the story of Gibbons and Katz
(1992) to our framework. Endogenous mobility improves the job matching between
workers and industries. Highly able workers employed in firm B can switch to firm
A while workers with low ability employed in firm A can switch to firm B at stage
3. This process can be explained by the learning effects in the urban area. The final
stage starts from the time when there is perfect observation of worker’s ability. The
matching process is not random in the stage 3. The search markets are segmented,
and positively associated with the worker’s abilities and the firm’s technologies at
this stage. There is endogenous mobility of workers among two types of firms in
the final stage3).
3.2. Abilities and the Migration Equilibrium
Migration decisions are based on the returns to urban job. The returns to firm
(or sector) in urban area is determined by a lottery. Each worker knows the level
of his/her own abilities. Potential migrants observe the expected value of returns
to abilities in urban area E(γ) in the second and third stage for individual i. For
simplicity, we assume that E(γ) summarizes the returns to ability at both the second
and third stage. The expected returns to the urban job for individual iwith ability ωi
in the rural area is E(Wi) = E(γ) ∗ ωi. Following Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006),
ability is assumed to have a level of ωi ∈ {0, 12 , 1}. The expected returns to the urban
job is zero, E(γ)/2, and E(γ) respectively. Three types of migration equilibria arise:
(1) only low type workers remain in rural areas, (2) low and medium types remain
in rural areas, (3) everyone remains in rural areas. Each condition can be sustained
within each rural area.
2) In July 1997, the returns to agricultural sector and export-oriented industries rose due to the baht
devaluation. These sectors were booming because of exogenous currency advantages. The causal effects
of the financial shock in 1997 on rural and urban labor market is task for the future.
3) Before turning to observe the migration decision, we add some mention of learning in the urban
labor market. Instead of deriving the learning process (job shopping/sectoral mobility/and beween-job
mobility) following Jovanovic (1979), Gibbons and Katz (1992), Topel and Ward (1993), Farber and
Gibbons (1996), Neal (1999), and providing direct evidence from NLSY by Yankow (2003), this paper
assumes that the effects of learning by migrating on wages appears in sectoral movers and between-job
movers in urban area.
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Condition 1. R < E(γ)/2
Condition 2. E(γ)/2 < R < E(γ)
Condition 3. E(γ) < R
The statistical inference of the conditions is our target. We are able to test
for self-selection on the migration decision using the observational data including
characteristics of migrants and employment outcome at the destination.
Our theoretical framework predicts that (1) the probability of staying in a rural
area is negatively related to the individual’s abilities and (2) the returns to the urban
job E(Wi) are positively related to the abilities ωi and assignment to the urban
migrants sample D.
Pr(Di = 1) = 1 − ωi (1)
logWi j = α + βD(ωi) + ωi + γ j (2)
These specification need to be verified empirically to get a consistent estimate of
the effects of urban migrants on the returns to the urban job. We can estimate the
returns to the urban job using observational data. The main point of this expres-
sion is the causal effects of abilities ωi on the incidence of urban migrants D(ωi).
The empirical methodology for estimating the returns to the urban job is shown in
section 5.
3.3. Testable Hypotheses
We summarize our simple model for describing some testable hypotheses here.
The model has the following theoretical implications: (1) the probability of staying
in rural area is negatively related to the individual’s abilities and (2) the returns to
the urban job are positively correlated to the abilities and incidence of the urban
migrants. It is time now to formulate some empirical questions or some testable
hypotheses regarding the rural and urban labor markets: do individuals become
more productive after moving to the megalopolis? Three testable hypotheses are
described simply here. The first hypothesis supports self-selection in the migration
decision: relatively efficient individuals become migrants and these individuals also
have a good job-match in the new location. We test it for each migration streams.
The second hypothesis support the improvement of average productivity over time:
the average performance of migrants with long experience is better than those with
short experience due to sorting or learning by migrating.
Hypothesis 1. There is a positive self-selection on individual abilities for “new
entrants” into the urban labor market. There is a negative self-selection on indi-
vidual abilities for “new exits” from the urban labor market.
This hypothesis suggests that (1) a young worker with high abilities moves from
the rural to the urban labor market and (2) a young worker with low abilities moves
from the urban to the rural labor market. This implies the existence of natural
selection mechanism exists in the urban labor market.
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Hypothesis 2. Average productivity for a long stayer is higher than that of a
short stayer in the rural and urban labor market through the two-sided learning
process between firm and worker (i.e. selection mechanism over time) or learning
by migrating.
This hypothesis proposes that (1) sorting matters among the local labor market
and (2) learning by migrating exist in the local labor market.
4. Data
In this section, we examine the “reason for migration” and “duration of migra-
tion” provide statistical evidence based on the wages of migrants, using data from
the Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994 to 1996. The data set presents three issues
related to (1) geography; (2) the reason for migration and duration of migration; (3)
evidence on wages. In fact, the proper treatment of these issues provides the key to
understanding the self-selection mechanism and learning by migrating effects for
migrants.
4.1. The Thailand Labor Force Survey
The data source used in this paper is The Thailand Labor Force Survey (here-
after LFS), 1994–1996 by the The National Statistical Office (NSO) of Thailand.
This individual-level data provides the information on many individual character-
istics: gender, structure of family, years of schooling, years of labor market ex-
perience, wages (or profit for self-employed household and profit for agricultural
household), labor force status, migration status, hours and days of weekly work, oc-
cupation, industry, region, marital status; and employer characteristics: firm size,
industry, and fringe benefits.
LFS is implemented four times per year. The first round of the survey is done
in February, the dry season in Thailand. The third round is done in August, during
the monsoon (agricultural) season. We use only the third round survey because we
can neglect seasonal labor migration at the dry season. The second and third rounds
are carried out in May and November, respectively. Because LFS does not follow
individuals from year to year, this study cannot provide the information on labor
mobility from the pre-crisis period to post crisis period.
The sample used in this paper comes from not only the “Greater Bangkok Area”
and rural areas: we use the whole sample of the Kingdom of Thailand, year 1994
to year 1996. We would like to mention some of the geographic characteristics.
This paper constructs a GBA (Greater Bangkok Area) dummy variable equals to 1
if the province is included in the Bangkok metropolitan area. Almost all industry
and occupation tend to agglomerate in GBA.
4.2. Data on Migrants
Here, we shall examine our pooled sample of the Thailand Labor Force Sur-
vey (hereafter LFS). LFS is a random sampling of all households in Thailand taken
during two survey rounds (February and August) every year. This paper pools the
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Table 2 Sample size by reason, migration streams, and duration
Subsample Less than 1 year 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years Total
Rural-to-rural 11,530 9,377 8,141 6,412 4,061 39,521
Job-seeking 9,495 7,364 6,028 4,527 2,822 30,236
Household relations 2,035 2,013 2,113 1,885 1,239 9,285
Urban-to-rural 2,451 1,588 1,275 854 533 6,701
Job-seeking 2,094 1,339 1,056 711 435 5,635
Household relations 357 249 219 143 98 1,066
Rural-to-urban 1,185 1,318 1,282 1,113 696 5,594
Job-seeking 1,083 1,200 1,170 1,032 625 5,110
Household relations 102 118 112 81 71 484
Urban-to-urban 473 405 383 305 147 1,713
Job-seeking 248 218 216 147 57 886
Household relations 225 187 167 158 90 827
Notes: The first column shows migration streams and the reason for migration by migration stream.
Each column shows years of stay from time of migration until the survey week. We exclude students,
self-employed, housewives, and farmers in the analysis. We focus on migrant wages worker only.
We also drop the sample of Education/Training, Medical treatment, and Other reasons. We classify
migrants related to job search, job transfer, and back to former place of residence into “Job-seeking”
migrants.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994–1996.
annual sample of LFS in 1994 to 1996. We do not add our sample to the LFS from
1997 to present. But the impacts were uneven for each occupation and industry.
The number of pooled observations adds up to approximately one million. This
paper leaves out agricultural and self-employed workers, housewives, and students.
The result is a sample of 250,000 wage workers in which 53,529 are migrants. We
concentrate on this sample in this paper to do a statistical inference with aggregate
patterns of migration and its microeconomic consequences. We do not examine
the 200,000 residents (i.e. non-migrants) among the sample of wage workers. The
main contents of LFS are the following: gender, age, years of education, weekly
wage, bonus, occupation, industry, firm size, unemployment spells, reason for
migration, and length of stay when the survey was taken.
For the moment, let us look closely at our key variables for empirical analysis.
Variables such as the “reason for migration” and “length of stay when the survey
was taken” (or duration and exposure to destination) have unique characteristics.
The variable the “reason for migration” can be grouped into seven categories: (1)
Job search; (2) Job transfer; (3) Education/Training; (4) Medical treatment; (5)
Back to former place of residence; (6) Move with household head; and (7) Other
reasons. These reasons are automatically recorded for migrants who have 0 to 4
years of experience in each destination. Next, duration or exposure to each desti-
nation is recorded for migrants who also have 0 to 4 years of experience in each
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destination4). Based on the length of stay in migrant primacy destination, we shall
classify migrants into two main groups: (A) Job search, job transfer, and back to
former place of residence; (B) Move with the household head. We call the former
group “Job-seeking” or “Job related”. This distinct classification is useful for our
identification and estimation in the next section. We exclude the following three
categories: (3) Education/Training; (4) Medical treatment; and (7) Other reasons.
This paper focuses on the following categories: (1) Job search; (2) Job transfer;
(5) Back to former place of residence; (6) Move with household head. Secondly,
migration streams are also divided into four types: (1) from rural to rural areas;
(2) from urban to rural areas; (3) from rural to urban areas; and (4) from urban to
urban areas. Thirdly, the duration of migrant status is divided into five categories:
less than 1 year; 1 year; 2 years; 3 years; and 4 years of duration. All migrants are
classified by reason of migration, migration stream, and length of stay.
We tabulate the relationship between the reason for migration and duration of
destination in Table 2. The main group is rural to rural movers who accounts for
almost 40,000 migrants among the total sample of 53,000 Thai migrants. Our focus
is on migrants who have experience in the Greater Bangkok Area: urban to rural
movers and rural to urban movers. Migration attributed for the purpose of study
also constitutes about 20% of all migrants. First, the tendency of exit rises to a
peak within the first year of the move and after 3 years for migrants due to looking
job searches. On the other hand, the tendency of exit also rises to a peak after 3
years for migrants due for migrants who move with the household head.
4.3. Evidence on Wages by Migration Status
We are now ready to look at the evidence of wages on migration status. We
already assumed two labor markets: rural and urban. First, we look at the sample
of new entrants into the rural labor market from rural areas. Secondly, we also
look at the sample of new entrants into the rural labor market from urban areas.
The mean, standard deviations, and number of observations are shown in each cell
by migration status. The descriptive statistics for new entrants into the rural labor
market is shown in Table 3, using the whole sample. Comparing the wage differ-
entials between less than 1 year and 4 years of duration in the sample of rural-rural
migrants, we find a gradual growth (from 6.656 to 6.959) in the long-staying mi-
grants. Comparing the wage differentials between less than 1 year and 4 years of
duration in the sample of urban-rural migrants, there is a sharp growth (from 6.705
to 7.114) among the long staying migrants. This sample experienced steeper wage
differentials than rural-rural migrants. Next, we discuss the difference between ori-
gin of migration. The level of wages in rural areas is higher for migrants with some
experience of urban area than migrants moving from rural areas. This difference
4) Migrants who have 5 to 9 years of experience are also recorded. However, there is no record of
the original area, making it impossible for us to specify their migration streams from original area to
destination area. Thus, we do not include these migrants who have 5 to 9 years of experience in our
empirical analysis.
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Table 3 Log of weekly wages for new entrants into the rural labor market by duration
Subsample Mean S.D Obs.
Rural-to-rural migrants 6.807 .660 39521
Less than 1 year 6.656 .668 11530
1 year 6.796 .657 9377
2 years 6.870 .634 8141
3 years 6.915 .641 6412
4 years 6.959 .647 4061
Urban-to-rural migrants 6.859 .694 6701
Less than 1 year 6.705 .670 2451
1 year 6.853 .690 1588
2 years 6.944 .672 1275
3 years 7.025 .674 854
4 years 7.114 .729 533
Notes: All new entrants into rural labor market are classified by reason
for migration, migration streams, and years of stay. All new entrants is
restricted to wage workers aged 40 or below.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994–1996.
Table 4 Log of weekly wages for new entrants into the urban labor market by duration
Subsample Mean S.D Obs.
Rural-to-urban migrants 6.771 .474 5594
Less than 1 year 6.652 .460 1185
1 year 6.740 .466 1318
2 years 6.777 .443 1282
3 years 6.840 .490 1113
4 years 6.909 .490 696
Urban-to-urban migrants 7.075 .507 1713
Less than 1 year 6.963 .480 473
1 year 7.070 .496 405
2 years 7.093 .516 383
3 years 7.142 .494 305
4 years 7.266 .548 147
Notes: All new entrants into the urban labor market are classified by
reason for migration, migration stream, and duration of stay. All new
entrants are restricted to wage workers aged 40 or below.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994–1996.
seems to represent age. Urban to rural migrants are concentrated in their late 20s or
30s. They are usually older than rural to rural migrants or rural to urban migrants.
The descriptive statistics for new entrants into the urban labor market are shown
in Table 4. Comparing the wage differentials between less than 1 year and 4 years of
duration in the sample of rural-urban migrants, we also find a gradual growth (from
6.705 to 7.114) among the long staying migrants. We also see a slow growth (from
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6.652 to 6.909) in the long staying migrants from rural areas. The level of urban
wages is also lower than for rural to rural migrants or urban to rural migrants. This
is because of a differential of age and labor market experience among migrants.
Looking at the urban-urban category, we compare the wage differentials between
less than 1 year and 4 years of duration in the sample of urban-urban migrants.
There is also a gradual growth (from 6.963 to 7.266) in the long staying migrants.
Next, we compare the difference between origin of migration. The level of wages in
urban area is higher for migrants who have more experience in urban areas than new
migrants from rural areas. This difference seems to be represented by age and urban
experience. Finally, we look at the wage differentials between migration streams:
from rural to urban and from urban to urban. As expected, the level of wages is
considerably higher for new entrants from urban areas than new entrants from rural
areas. This is most likely due to differentials with respect to age, urban experience
(i.e. benefits from searches within urban areas or improving productivity), and
sectors (i.e. formal and informal) between the migration streams.
5. Identification Strategy
This section provides a simple framework for empirically testing our hypothe-
ses. We assume that a young worker has all the information to evaluate his or her
own ability as well as the returns to this ability. It is easy for us to imagine a
correlation among own ability, migration decision, destination, and returns to abil-
ity. If there is a self-selection bias in the migration decision and destination, it is
not easy to evaluate the true learning effects in urban areas. This paper proposes
a novel method for evaluating self-selection and learning by migrating effects us-
ing the unique characteristics of the Thailand Labor Force Survey: the “reason
for migration” and “length of stay” for migrants. Our identification approach is
quite different from that of Clerides et al. (1998) who study learning by exporting
effects among Columbian, Moroccan, and Chilean exporters using establishment
level panel-data. Our identification strategy is also quite different from Glaeser and
Mare´ (2001), who examine learning effects in cities using US panel-data; PSID and
NLSY.
First, every worker has to make a migration decision in every period: stay in
the current labor market or move to another area. We call this decision variable
M ∈ {0, 1}. Staying is captured by M = 0 and moving is captured by M = 1. In
this paper we restrict our analysis to movers (i.e. M = 1). Secondly, every worker
chooses his/her labor market every period: rural or urban labor market. We call
this location choice variable K ∈ {R,U}. A rural worker is captured by K = R and
urban worker by K = U. Thirdly, we define the variable Z ∈ {0, 1} which is the
“reason for migration” for movers. We have already classified migrants into two
main groups: Group (A) Job-Seeking (which includes job search, job transfer, and
back to former place of residence) and Group (B) Move with the household head.
With respect to household-related reasons of migration, we assume that the member
moving with the household head is captured by Z = 1 and the member actively
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seeking employment or another reason is captured by Z = 0. These bring us to the
second point: the description of decision and state space for each individual.
These assumptions on migration decision and migration streams lead us fur-
ther into an empirical investigation. We assume that the household head decides
whether his family will migrate or not. Therefore we use heterogeneity in the rea-
son for migration as an exogenous source of variation in endogenous variables.
This paper constructs a household related dummy variable D1H . If a young worker
follows the household head in moving, then the econometrician will treat the mem-




1 if Z = 1, K for M = 1
0 if Z = 0, K for M = 1
The outcome variable for individual worker i in location K and at survey week
s is defined as YKis . The cross-section outcome function is formalized as an additive
separable form.
YKis = f (Xis) + Γ · DKH + g (ωis, ξis)
where f (X) is a function of a vector of observed individual characteristics, DKH
is a dummy variable equal to one if individual i follows the household head to
move to location K, and g (ωis, ξis) is a function of unobserved characteristics for
an individual worker and firm: ωis is an error term for unobserved abilities for
individual i at survey week s, and unobserved firm specific characteristics ξis.
The choice of location K correlates to pecuniary returns to individual charac-
teristics: an observed component Xi and component of unobserved ability φi. The
high frequency of movement to urban area for young and more educated workers
is a known and observed fact. Young and highly educated workers know the urban
area to be a thick labor market (with varieties in occupation, industry, and technol-
ogy). The return to schooling is also higher in urban areas. Recent literature Borjas
et al. (1992), Wheeler (2001), Dahl (2002), Moretti (2004a), and Moretti (2004b)
also show this using USA data. This is the logic of self-selection. The location
choice K of the migrant in the household related subgroup (Z = 1) is assumed to be
orthogonal to his/her ability ω, and the location choice K of the migrant job-related
subgroup (Z = 0) is assumed to be non-orthogonal to ability ω by definition.
ωi ∝ DR1H = 0, DU1H = 0
ωi ⊥ DR1H = 1, DU1H = 1
Undoubtedly, a worker in the local labor market K has a location specific pre-
mium; however, the econometrician cannot distinguish between the true premiums
in location and the self-selection bias in the migration decision. Our identification
method suggests that movement with the household head is exogenous on migration
decision. We call the member of D1H = 1 the treatment group. We can examine the
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true effects of moving to local labor market K on individual outcome by looking
at the coefficient Γ. This coefficient Γ signifies the premium differentials between
the household related (D1H = 1) and job related (D1H = 0) subgroup in location
K. This paper develops a new and a simple identification method for distinguish-
ing between the true premium in K and the impact of the self-selection bias on the
migration decision to K.
Next, we try to identify learning by migrating effects (i.e. productivity increas-
ing based on migration) in location K. For example, learning by migrating effects
in urban areas include formal training, learning by doing, knowledge spillovers
by communication, reduction in mismatches by turnover, and R&D investments
by firms. We assume that firms can offer a wage after removing the returns to
investment in technology. If this assumption is valid, then we can exclude the
latest possibility of learning by migrating effects: investment in technology by
firms. Now we may restrict our discussion to learning effects due to individual
efforts (i.e. learning and job turnover) and spillovers.
To study learning effects, we use the variable τ for duration of stay after
migration and relate this to experience in K. The data “length of migrant stay”
τ ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} years is useful for the identification of learning by migrating ef-
fects. This paper divides years T ∈ {S , L} according to the duration of stay τ. The
short-staying migrant worker is captured by T = S . The longer-staying migrant
worker is captured by T = L. We define (1) a short experience as S ∈ {0, 1, 2} years
and (2) a long experience as L ∈ {3, 4} years of moving to current location K based
on the survey week. We are also now able to expand the individual decision space
from D to DT with duration of stay.
6. Testing for Self-selection on Migration
6.1. Specification and Estimation
First, we test whether there is a self-selection bias on ability when a young
worker moves to location K. The outcome variable is the wage level. The wage rep-
resents self-selection about employment and productivity. To test for self-selection
in observed characteristics and unobserved abilities, we estimate the reason dif-
ferentials from the cross-section wage function following Gibbons and Katz (1991)
and Gibbons and Katz (1992) who studied the impacts of reason for separation from
the last job on the wage level of new employment using an establishment closure
sample and layoff sample. We run following linear regression formulations:
logWKis = Xisβ + Γ · DKH + ωis + ξKis (3)
where the dependent variable logWKis is the log of weekly earnings for individual
i at survey week s in location K, X is a vector of observed individual characteris-
tics (gender, age, education, square of years of education, and marital status), the
dummy variable DKH = 1 if individual i moves to location K due to household re-
lated reasons, and otherwise if individual i moves to location K to actively seek
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employment. ωis is unobserved abilities for individual i, ξKis is unobserved firm
technology if individual i is employed in this firm. Finally, uKis is a mixed error
component of ωis and ξKis .
6.2. Results
The expected signs of the estimates on self-selection are as follows. First, the
coefficient Γ of urban-rural migrant is expected to be positive (i.e. job-seeking mi-
grants receive lower rural premiums than migrants based on household relations
because of the negative self-selection on exit decisions from the urban labor mar-
ket).
H0 : ΓUR < 0
H1 : ΓUR > 0 (negative self-selection for job-seekers)
Secondly, the coefficient Γ of rural-urban migrant is expected to be negative
(i.e. job-seeking migrants receive higher urban premiums than migrants based on
household relations because of the positive self-selection on entry decisions into
the urban labor market).
H0 : ΓRU ≥ 0
H1 : ΓRU < 0 (positive self-selection for job-seekers)
The estimates for the four subsamples urban (rural) migrants to urban (rural)
areas in Table 5 provide evidence that there are highly significant on self-selection
effects of unobserved abilities: (1) there is positive self-selection for new entries
into both the urban and rural labor markets from rural areas; (2) there is negative
self-selection for new exits from the urban labor market and movers within urban
areas. The estimates show that the household related subgroup has approximately
4.8% lower wages than migrants in the job related subgroup in the rural to rural
subsample. Alternatively, the estimates show that job-seeking migrants earn 4.8%
higher wages than migrants in the household related subgroup. Job turnovers and
established residences in the rural area have positive self-selection effects. For the
urban to rural subsample, there is a negative and highly significant self-selection
bias of unobserved abilities for job-seeking migrants, who have 5.3% lower wages
than movers with household head.
On average, job-seeking migrants in the urban-rural subsample have a 5.3%
lower level of rural true premium than migrants in the household related subgroup.
In other words, if the job-seeking subgroup sample had the same level of ability
as the household related subgroup, the job search sample will have a true rural
premium. Therefore, the “low ability” of the job search sample reduces their own
rural premium from the true rural premium to a lower level. Nearly all urban to
rural movers were former migrants to urban areas from rural areas.
For the rural-urban and urban-urban subgroups, migrants for household related
reasons have a true urban premium independent of self-selection effects with re-
spect to location choice and ability based on identification strategy in the previous
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Table 5 Job-seeking migrants from rural to urban had higher wage level while job-seeking migrants
from urban to rural experienced lower wage level
Subsample Γ Adjusted R2 Obs.
Rural-to-rural −.048∗∗∗ .428 39521
(.005)
Urban-to-rural .053∗∗∗ .342 6701
(.018)
Rural-to-urban −.088∗∗∗ .329 5594
(.022)
Urban-to-urban .080∗∗∗ .474 1713
(.020)
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of weekly wages. The house-
hold related subgroup dummy variable equals 1 if individual i moves to
location K for household related reasons, and otherwise if individual i
moves to location K to actively seek employment. The explanatory vari-
ables are gender, age, years of education, square of years of education,
marital status, and a household related subgroup dummy. All individual
explanatory variables are highly significant at the 1% level. This table
focuses on each coefficient of the exogenous variable on the migration
decision: household related subgroup dummy. Numbers in parentheses
are standard errors.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994–1996.
∗∗∗ significant at the 1 % level.
section. The coefficient of this dummy variable suggests that there is a differen-
tial of unobserved ability from the urban premium. Estimates for the rural-urban
subsample show a positive and highly significant self-selection bias of unobserved
abilities for job-seekers, who have 8.8% higher wages than the household related
control group. Estimates for the job-seeking migrants in the rural-urban subsample
show a positive self-selection effect of abilities. Estimates for the urban-urban sub-
sample also show negative and significant self-selection effects of unobserved abil-
ity for migrant job-seekers who have 8.0% lower wages than those in the household
related control group. Job turnovers and established residence in the urban area do
not seem to have positive self-selection effects.
We are now ready to say that there are positive and quite significant (1% level)
self-selection effects of unobserved abilities for migrants from rural areas for both
the rural to rural and rural to urban subsamples. But on average, there is a signif-
icant negative self-selection bias of unobserved abilities for migrants from urban
areas for both urban to rural and urban to urban subsamples5). In summary, the
high ability of young migrants from rural areas is clearly reflected in wages in rural
and urban areas on average. Our model predicts that a migrant with high ability can
5) These results support the “lemon” effect for migrants from urban area. On the other hand, they also
support the no lemon effect for migrants from rural area.
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keep a job as long as he/she obtains a job requiring skill/training/know-how early
in the migration process.
Migrants who find jobs choose to stay. But migrants who cannot find jobs re-
turn to their place of origin or move to another location to seek jobs. Both rural
movers from urban areas and urban movers from urban areas seem to have a bad
match in urban area. However, the results using the urban to rural and urban to
urban subsamples (see Table 5) show that there are smaller learning effects in ur-
ban area for the job-seeking subgroup than for the household related subgroup. If
there are positive spillovers into the urban area, the gaps between the two types of
migrants mean that there is heterogeneity in learning through migrating effects in
urban areas.
7. Testing for Learning by Migrating
7.1. Specification and Estimation
We test our next hypothesis on learning through migrating effects to improve
productivity after a young worker moves to location K. Learning through migrat-
ing effects are mentioned by Glaeser and Mare´ (2001) using panel regressions. It
is a comprehensive work. However, there are shortcomings concerning the self-
selection bias on migration decision and destinations.
The outcome variable is also the wage level. We divide the explanatory vari-
able DKH into the short D
K
H(S ) and long D
K
H(L) cohort. To test for learning through
migrating effects, we compare the coefficients Γ(S ) and Γ(L) of the household re-
lated subgroup dummy variables. The coefficient Γ(L) includes various sources of
improved productivity due to individual efforts in location K (for example, formal
training or learning by doing), due to knowledge spillovers in location K, and due
to reallocation effects by sorting and two-sided learning between individuals and
firms. The occurrence of reallocation represents self-selection on ability. Informa-
tion on matching quality is accumulated by firms and individuals after production.
If we assume that ability does not change over time, we can say that realloca-
tion effects are self-selective innate (or natural) ability. If we assume that individual
ability changes over time through learning by migrating effects, we can say that
reallocation effects are self-selective in terms of acquired ability after migration.
If any doubt remains about identification between learning through migrating ef-
fects (i.e. individual efforts and spillovers) and reallocation effects, it is clear that
average productivity can be higher for a long cohort L than a short cohort S 6).
To see these effects, we also specify and estimate cohort differentials in estimates
of reason differentials from the cross-section wage function by the following
6) The literature on TFP shows in detail that the higher level of productivity among long-lived firms than
short-lived firms can be explained by the exiting of non-productive firms. This reallocation effect can
also be drawn from the literature on the export market and two-sided learning in the labor market. Our
theoretical model also predicts natural selection or survival of the fittest through job mobility.
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linear regressions.
logWKis = Xisβ + Γ(S ) · DKH(S ) + Γ(L) · DKH(L) + ωis + ξKis (4)
where logWKis is the log of weekly earnings for individual i in location K, Xis a vec-
tor of observable individual characteristics (gender, age, years of education, square
of years of education, marital status), the dummy variables DKH(S ) and D
K
H(L) are
equal to 1 if individual imoved with the household head to location K and has short
(long, respectively) experience in location K, and uKis is an error term of individual
unobserved abilities φi and firm’s technology, ξis.
7.2. Results







and DKH(4) in the four migration flow subsamples: (1) rural to rural; (2) urban
to rural; (3) rural to urban; and (4) urban to urban. The coefficient of dummy
variable Γ signifies the differentials of the location specific premium between the
two migrant subgroups of job-seekers and household relations in each location K.
The coefficient Γ(0) means the difference of the location premium for staying for
the two migrant groups with less than 1 year of duration. The same is true for the
coefficient Γ(1), Γ(2), Γ(3), and Γ(4) for long-staying workers in the two groups for
1 year, 2 years, 3 years, and 4 years of duration respectively.
The estimates for each sample in Table 6 and Table 7 show that there are smaller
reallocation effects in the urban labor market and there are no learning effects in
urban areas for “new exits for job-seeking” from urban areas: (1) the wage gap
between job-seekers and household related migrants in the rural-rural subsample
increases due to the improvement of job-matching effects (or reallocation effects
through self-selection) for job-seeking migrants looking for jobs in rural area; (2)
the wage gap between job seekers and household related migrants in the urban-
rural subsample due to learning through migrating effects for household related
migrants; (3) the wage gap between job seekers and household relations in the
rural-urban subsample increases due to the improvement job-matching effects (or
reallocation effects through self-selection) for migrants of looking for jobs in urban
areas; (4) the wage gap between job-seekers and household related migrants in
the urban-urban subsample due to learning through migrating effects for household
related migrants.
It is worthwhile to mention the relationship between the short- and the long-
duration migrants in each migration stream. Table 2 presents some interesting facts
regarding the similarity and differences between the reasons for migration. Here,
we look more carefully into our empirical results. The estimate for the rural-to-
rural subsample with short-staying (1 year and 2 years of duration) in rural areas
shows that job-seekers have 3.4% higher wages and 7.2% higher wages, respec-
tively, than household related migrants. On the other hand, for long-staying (3 years
and 4 years of duration) migrants in rural areas after migration from another rural
area, job-seekers have 10.9% and 9.1% higher wages, respectively, than household
related migrants. There is a steep rise from short to long-experienced migrants
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Table 6 Household related subgroup dummies in wage equations of each duration in the rural
Subsample Γ0 Γ1 Γ2 Γ3 Γ4
Rural-to-rural .013 −.034∗∗∗ −.072∗∗∗ −.109∗∗∗ −.091∗∗∗
(.011) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.016)
Adjusted R2 .359 .429 .455 .482 .438
Obs. 11530 9377 8141 6412 4061
Urban-to-rural .004 .037 .112∗∗∗ .155∗∗∗ .050
(.032) (.038) (.035) (.052) (.055)
Adjusted R2 .230 .340 .406 .437 .516
Obs. 2451 1588 1275 854 533
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of weekly wages. The explanatory variables are gender, age,
years of education, square of years of education, marital status, and a household relation migrants
dummy. All individual explanatory variables are highly significant at the 1% level. This table also
focuses on each coefficient of the exogenous variable on the migration decision: household relations
migrants dummy. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994–1996.
∗∗∗ significant at the 1% level.
Table 7 Household related subgroup dummies in wage equations of each duration in the urban
Subsample Γ0 Γ1 Γ2 Γ3 Γ4
Rural-to-urban .069 −.170∗∗∗ −.086∗∗ −.003 −.206∗∗∗
(.048) (.047) (.044) (.063) (.049)
Adjusted R2 .356 .363 .349 .275 .292
Obs. 1185 1318 1282 1113 696
Urban-to-urban −.051 .115∗∗∗ .036 .220∗∗∗ .196∗∗∗
(.040) (.040) (.049) (.041) (.076)
Adjusted R2 .418 .585 .427 .556 .421
Obs. 473 405 383 305 147
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of weekly wages. The explanatory variables are gender, age,
years of education, square of years of education, marital status, and a household relations migrants
dummy. All individual explanatory variables are highly significant at the 1% level. This table also
focuses on each coefficient of the exogenous variable on the migration decision: household relations
migrants dummy. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994–1996.
∗∗∗ significant at the 1% level.
∗∗ significant at the 5% level.
between the two types of migrants. It seems reasonable to suppose that there is
learning through migrating effects in rural areas or reallocation effects gained from
the sorting process through job-matching. Increased average productivity of job-
seekers can be explained by the differences of the survival rate between the two
types of migrants: job-seekers and household relations migrants. Migrants who
cannot find a good job match seem to change their location at an early stage, before
the second year. However, migrants who find a good match will stay in rural areas
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and become a long-duration migrant. It is likely that an improvement in average
productivity for a long cohort of job-seekers can be explained by the survival of the
fittest in the rural to rural subsample7).
The estimate for the urban-to-rural subsample with the short-staying migrants
in Table 6 shows that migrants looking for jobs have 11.2% and 15.5% lower wages
than migrants who move with the household head when they reach 2 and 3 years of
duration in rural areas. On the other hand, for migrants staying less than 1 year and
1 year, there is no significant difference between job-seeking and household relation
migrants. We can construct two hypotheses: (1) self-selection based on abilities;
(2) learning through migrating effects in each location. The wage gap between the
short and long cohort among the two types of migrants can be explained by the
difference of learning speeds in rural areas8). From Table 2, we see that the exit
patterns of the two types of migrants are similar: job-searching versus moving with
the household head. We may say that the difference between exit patterns is not the
main reason. The result for migrants with 4 years of duration in rural area suggests
that there is no significant difference between job-seeking and household relation
migrants. The household relations migrant who can find a good match stay in rural
area and enter long duration status, with 4 years of duration.
Let us, for the moment, examine urban migrants. The estimate for the rural to
urban subsample with short-experienced migrants in urban areas in Table 7 shows
that job-seeking migrants with 1 and 2 years of duration in urban areas experience
17% higher wages and 8.6% higher wages, respectively, than household relation
migrants. On the other hand, especially for long-staying migrants with 4 years
of duration job-seekers experience 20.6% higher wages than household relation
migrants. The wage gap between the two types of migrants decreases due to con-
vergence of abilities between the two groups or due to their remaining in urban
job-seeking. Exit patterns are also quite similar for job-seekers versus household
relation migrants, as seen from Table 2. If a young migrant has a bad match in an
urban area, then he/she will change his/her location to look for another job match,
the average productivity of migrants in urban area can be improved over time. We
observe that this reallocation effect is common for the two types of migrants. We
can present two explanations: first, a decline in the reallocation effects among job-
seeking migrants is the main explanation, it is likely that less able workers will
remain in the urban area due to the thickness of the market. This leads to our find-
ing of a declining gap between the two types of migrants. Secondly, if learning by
7) A possible explanation is: if learning by migrating effects exist, then the wage gap between short and
long durations can be explained by the difference in learning speeds between the two types of migrants.
Another explanation is: if reallocation effects (through self-selection) are the main reason, then the wage
gap between short and long durations can be explained by the difference of exit speeds from the rural
labor market between job-seekers and household relation migrants.
8) In the previous section, we discussed the fact that there is negative self-selectivity in ability for urban
to rural movers. There are complementarities between ability and learning speed. We cannot identify
whether ability is main explanation or not here. Even if any complication remains about complementar-
ities, it is clear that there is gap between the two types of migrants from urban to rural areas.
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migrating effects is the main explanation, we may say that household relation mi-
grants catch up with job-seeking migrants: there is an observed convergence among
urban migrants.
Our results on urban migrants show that in the urban-to-urban subsample, short-
staying job-seeking migrants with less than 1 year of duration experience 5.1%
higher wages than household relation migrants. But this estimate is not significant.
This result suggests there are no significant differences between the two types of
migrants among the new migrants from urban to urban areas. On the other hand,
long-staying (3 years and 4 years of duration) job-seeking migrants experience 22%
and 19.6% lower wages than household relation migrants. We shall now look more
carefully into the two explanations. First, there is a substantial difference in the
total number of movers between those looking for a job versus those moving with
the head of family. If reallocation effects are the main explanation of the wage
gap, then we will see a decrease in this gap: there are strong reallocation effects
among migrants looking for jobs, and sorting effects force them to improve their
average productivity. But this hypothesis contradicts the gap of the two estimates.
Average productivity among migrants looking for jobs decreases. Secondly, we can
refer to the possibility of learning by migrating effects in the urban area. It seems
reasonable that the differentials in ability or differentials of learning speed for the
two types of migrants are quite significant on average. The initial gap between
migrants looking for jobs and migrants moving with the household head seems to
wide over time.
7.3. Robustness Check
In earlier parts of the paper, we discussed the differences in the learning by
migrating effects due to various reasons for the four migration streams. Next, we
test for learning effects related to the length of stay of migrants by the reason for
migration. Two dummy variables are used to estimate the impacts of the length
of stay on productivity for two types of migrants: job-seekers and those based on
household relations. For job-seeking migrants (i.e. Z = 0), the dummy variable DKH
is equal to 1 if individual i moved to location K.
To see the learning by migrating effects of the length of stay on productivity,
we specify and estimate reason differentials based on cohort differentials from the
cross-section wage function. We run the following regression equation for the rea-
son of migration: job-seeking migrants (DKH = 0) and those moving with household
head (DKH = 1).
logWKis = Xisβ + ΓS (1) · d1 + ΓS (2) · d2 + ΓS (3) · d3 + ΓS (4) · d4 + ωis + ξKis (5)
where where logWKis is the log of weekly earnings for individual i in location K,
Xis is a vector of observable individual characteristics (gender, age, years of edu-
cation, square of years of education, marital status), coefficient ΓS (1) captures the
difference in productivity between movers who have a duration of less than 1 year
and a duration of 1 year for the job-seeking migrants. On the other hand, coeffi-
cienct ΓS (2) also captures the difference of productivity between movers who have
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Table 8 Each duration dummy in wage equations by reason for migration in the rural
Subsample 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years Adjusted R2 Obs.
Rural-to-rural
Job-seeking .023∗∗∗ .055∗∗∗ .035∗∗∗ .083∗∗∗ .464 30236
(.007) (.008) (.008) (.010)
Household relations .042∗∗∗ .053∗∗∗ .038∗∗∗ .043∗∗∗ .338 9285
(.015) (.015) (.015) (.017)
Urban-to-rural
Job-seeking −.010 .050∗∗∗ .069∗∗∗ .102∗∗∗ .347 5635
(.018) (.020) (.025) (.032)
Household relations −.188∗∗∗ −.168∗∗∗ −.064∗∗∗ −.049∗∗∗ .338 1066
(.054) (.058) (.058) (.071)
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of weekly wages. The explanatory variables are gender,
age, years of education, square of years of education, marital status, and durations of experience in
rural area dummies. The benchmark duration is less than 1 year. All individual explanatory variables
are highly significant at the 1% level. This table also focuses on each coefficient of Short experience
dummies. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994–1996.
∗∗∗ significant at the 1% level.
a duration of less than 1 year and of 2 years among migrants based on household
relations, and so on.
These coefficients provide us with an empirical understanding of the impact of
duration on abilities. There is an “endogeneity problem”: each individual chooses
the length of stay in location K after the migration, and the pitfall is related to com-
paring two coefficients due to sample truncation. However, we can focus on the
results of the share of long-experienced migrants for the two types of migrants
because Table 2 suggests same patterns of sample-attrition for job-seekers and
people with household relations among urban-rural migrants and among rural-
urban migrants.
Empirical results are given in Table 8 for the rural labor market and Table 9
for the urban labor market. There is sharp empirical observation of learning by
migrating effects for job-seekers in rural areas: we have several results to show that
the coefficient is positively significant at the 1% level. Job-seeking migrants from
rural to rural areas experienced a gradual wage increase between 2.3% (1 year of
duration), 5.5% (2 years), 3.5% (3 years), and 8.3% (4 years), respectively. On the
other hand, we have the following observation regarding the learning by migrating
effects for rural-rural migrants based on household relations: the coefficient is also
positively significant at the 1% level. Household-related migrants from rural to
rural areas also experienced a slight wage increase of 4.2% (1 year of duration),
5.3% (2 years), 3.8% (3 years), and 4.3% (4 years) respectively. For the learning
by migrating effects of urban-rural migrants based on household relations, We also
obtained significant coefficients. In conclusion: (1) there is a steep wage increase
for job-seekers with long experienced (3 years of duration and more) in the rural
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Table 9 Each duration dummy in wage equations by reason for migration in the urban
Subsample 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years Adjusted R2 Obs.
Rural-to-urban
Job-seeking .068∗∗∗ .099∗∗∗ .149∗∗∗ .224∗∗∗ .357 5110
(.016) (.016) (.016) (.018)
Household relations −.087∗∗∗ −.190∗∗∗ −.155∗∗ −.173∗∗∗ .277 484
(.071) (.073) (.073) (.070)
Urban-to-urban
Job-seeking −.039 −.044 −.133∗∗∗ −.079∗∗∗ .434 886
(.035) (.032) (.037) (.052)
Household relations −.151∗∗∗ .003 −.107∗∗∗ −.058 .520 827
(.042) (.040) (.041) (.054)
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of weekly wages. The explanatory variables are gender,
age, years of education, square of years of education, marital status, and durations of experience in
rural area dummies. The benchmark duration is less than 1 year. All individual explanatory variables
are highly significant at the 1% level. This table also focuses on each coefficient of Short experience
dummies. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Source: Thailand Labor Force Survey, 1994–1996.
∗∗∗ significant at the 1% level.
∗∗ significant at the 5% level.
labor market and (2) however, there is sudden wage declining for migrants with
short experience (1 year and 2 years of duration) based on household relations
in the rural labor market. The wage level for migrants with household relations
is higher when they newly enter a in rural area from an urban area. The main
difference in the reason for migration seems to be derived from the difference of
search intensity in the early stages after migration.
The empirical results in Table 9 also suggest that the advantage of migrants
with long experience exists. “New entrants” into the urban labor market experience
learning by migrating effects for job-seekers: the coefficients are positively signifi-
cant at the 1% level. While “new entrants” into the urban labor market experience
learning by migrating effects for those with household relations: the coefficients
are negatively significant at the 1% level. Job-seeking migrants from rural to rural
areas experienced a gradual wage increase of 6.8% (1 year of duration), 9.9% (2
years), 14.9% (3 years), and 22.4% (4 years), respectively. Comparing the impacts
of duration on wages between rural and urban areas for job-seeking migrants, there
is an advantage of staying because of the thick market externalities in the urban
area. Job-seeking migrants within the urban labor market also benefit from search
activities. On the other hand, migrants based on household relations do not expe-
rience any benefit from staying in the urban labor market. There is no advantage
for household relation migrants to stay in the urban labor market: the coefficient
is negative and significant. Job-seeking migrants from urban to urban areas ex-
perienced a gradual wage decrease of −13.3% (3 years of duration) and −7.9%
(4 years), respectively. Household related migrants from rural to rural areas also
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experienced a slight wage decrease between −15.1% (1 year of duration) and
−10.7% (3 years), respectively. We therefore conclude that both short (1 year and
2 years of duration) and long (3 years and 4 years of duration) experience job-
seekers of rural origin with gains in the urban labor market. These advantages of
duration of stay come from search activities in the urban labor market (thick market
externalities).
8. Discussion and Conclusion
Some issues remain. The first is, the validity of our instrumental variable used
in the reason for migration. Recent works by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) and
Angrist and Krueger (2001) argue for general shortcomings of instrumental vari-
ables due to natural experiment. Our identification strategy depends on whether
moving with the household head to a new location is orthogonal to individual abili-
ties: following the head is exogenous. We have to consider that the location choice
for migrants who move with the household head seems to be independent of their
characteristics. The choice of location seems to be exogenous for these household
relation migrants. But we can conjecture the existence of a co-location problem for
husbands and wives, following Costa and Kahn (2000). If there are non-random
strategic complementarities to co-location between wives and husbands, our iden-
tification strategy fails. It is an unsettled question. There is a room for a further
structural estimation of a model of collective behavior and household bargaining
process in migration decisions. Secondly, to study the self-selection effects on abil-
ities and the learning through migrating, we used wage worker migrants. This leads
to: sample selection bias. We have to examine transitions by migrants to agricul-
tural, self-employed, wage workers, and household workers such as housewives.
Thirdly, we do not control for the categories of occupation, industry, and firm size.
Self-selection effects on abilities and learning by migrating effects can be quite
different for these categories.
In this paper we developed a simple framework for identifying the learning by
migrating effects and self-selection effects on abilities with an instrumental vari-
able. This is the first attempt to identify learning by migrating effects from self-
selection effects using an exogenous source of variation, i.e., the reason for mi-
gration. This paper is useful for understanding the role of the urban labor market:
natural selection or the location of learning. Our empirical results for self-selection
on migrating are summarized below: (1) there is a significant positive self-selection
based on abilities for rural-urban job-seekers; and (2) there is a significant negative
self-selection based on abilities for urban-rural job-seekers significantly. Evidence
of a positive selection for “new entrants” to urban areas from rural areas also sup-
ports findings of Borjas et al. (1992). However, evidence of negative self-selection
for “new exits” to the rural area from urban area does not support for findings of
Glaeser and Mare´ (2001) using PSID and NLSY. The main difference between the
empirical results of Glaeser and Mare´ (2001) and our results using the Thailand
and Greater Bangkok dataset is attributed to the number, size, and matching exter-
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nalities in cities.
In short, these rigorous inferences suggest the existence of the survival of the
fittest in the urban labor market. Highly able job-seekers tend to move to the urban
labor market from rural areas, while less skilled job-seekers tend to exit from the
urban labor market to the rural labor market. The origin of migrants from the urban
labor market to rural areas can be rural areas. These migrants (i.e. returnees) moved
from the rural to the urban labor market and then back to the rural area because of
bad job-matching experiences in the urban labor market. Our empirical results
for learning by migrating effects are summarized below: (1) natural selection or
survival of the fittest plays a significant role in the urban labor market; and (2) there
are learning effects (through job-matching) for job-seeking migrants after migrating
to urban areas. This effect is larger in urban than in rural areas.
It seems reasonable to state that better job-matching can be found by rural-urban
migrants based on household relations after learning where better job opportunities
are located in the thick market. It is due to the difference in the necessity of getting
a job between job-seekers and household relation migrants. Household relation
migrants have more search or waiting premiums than impatient job-seekers. The
results for both rural-urban migrants can apply to those results for both urban-rural
migrants and urban-urban migrants but not for rural-rural migrants. These results
lead to the conclusion that there is a search option in the thick market.
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